Article Two: The Canadian Identity

Last week, we looked at how some of Laurier’s decisions involving Anglo-Canadians and French Canadians alienated many of his supporters from both sides. Now, in our second article of our six-part series on early twentieth century Canada, we will examine Canada’s identity, and how the Naval Issue and the Alaskan Boundary dispute distorted the perception of Canada an independent, autonomous nation.

This graph details the ship building statistics during the Anglo-German Naval Arms Race

At the time, England was in a naval race with the German Empire called the Dreadnought Crisis. In order to get a competitive edge over the Germans, the British asked Canada for funds to aid in this endeavour. As per usual, the French and English were divided on the matter; obviously the English wanted Canada to give the money to Britain, while the French wanted Canada to refuse and get a navy of their own; the British Royal Navy, up until 1810, guarded Canadian shorelines. Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier decided to compromise (and no one was surprised). In 1910, Laurier made the Naval Service Act which gave Canada its own navy, while still keeping the ties to the British Empire by making it so that it could be lent to the British in the event of an emergency.  Henri Bourassa claimed that an “emergency” would occur every four years, considering Britain’s rather warlike actions throughout the century, and reprimanded Laurier for allowing Canada to be dragged into those future conflicts.

This comic represents the divided opinion on Laurier due to his compromises.

Like Bourassa, many Canadians were skeptical of Laurier’s solution. The English believed that Canada’s navy was a mere joke and gave it the nickname “Tin-pot Navy.” Likewise, the French weren't too fond of the Act; they didn’t want Canada to be dragged into more imperialist wars at Canada’s expense. Universally disliked by most people, it became a major cause for concern in the 1911 election, and along with reciprocity the Naval Issue compelled many people to vote him out.

A comic representing the"Tin-pot Navy."

While Britain kept badgering Canada for handouts, yet another national power wanted something from Canadians. The United States wanted control of the Alaskan Panhandle, a region that had grown exponentially in importance since the Klondike Gold Rush, while Canada wanted an all-Canadian path to the Yukon.

In 1903, the Hey-Heybert Treaty  between Laurier and American President Theodore Roosevelt left it up to Britain to decide who should receive the land. Three Americans and two Canadians attended a meeting in London with Baron Alverstone for arbitration on the issue. In the end, much of the Panhandle was given to the United States (though not as much as they wanted). Many Canadians felt betrayed by this decision because it cut British Columbia’s coast in half, and the land was commonly thought to (by Canadians, albeit) belong to Canada.

This map annotated map shows the land that the
Americans and Canadians wanted, and how
Britain divided it.

These major issues undermined the notion that Canada was its own country. Having been forced to surrender land and navy at the mercy of the British showed that Canada’s international power was extremely limited, if it had any at all. These events are significant because of what they reveal about Canada’s international strength, and how its identity was dependent on the foreign affairs of the British rather than what Canadians wanted for themselves. Much like our rather neighbors to the south, an identity of our own required one thing that Laurier did not have: freedom from the British. To this day, Canada's identity is often mixed and has never really been defined due to the large variety of different cultures; so much so, in fact, that even the government chooses to explain Canada based on the cultural identity of nations and people before it. This shows how Canada’s struggle to define itself has not only shaped its identity, but it became the identity itself.